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This paper seeks to explain the causes and consequences of the U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis, and how this crisis has led to a generalized credit crunch in other financial sectors that 
ultimately affects the real economy. It postulates that, despite the recent financial 
innovations, the financial strategies—leveraging and financial risk mismatching—that led to 
the present crisis are similar to those found in the U.S. savings-and-loan debacle of the late 
1980s and in the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. However, these strategies are based 
on market innovations that have heightened, not reduced, systemic risks and financial 
instability. They are as the title implies: old wine in a new bottle. Going beyond these 
financial practices, the underlying structural causes of the crisis are located in the loose 
monetary policies of central banks, deregulation, and excess liquidity in financial markets 
that is a consequence of the kind of economic growth that produces various imbalances—
trade imbalances, financial sector imbalances, and wealth and income inequality. The 
consequences of excessive risk, moral hazards, and rolling bubbles are discussed. 
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This paper has four sections. Section I gives an overview of the subprime mortgage crisis, 
the recent financial instruments and innovations related to it, and how the crisis led to a 
generalized credit crunch in the financial industry. Section II discusses the causes of the 
crisis, which are located in the loose monetary policies of central banks, the global trade 
imbalance, wealth and income imbalance, and financial sector imbalance. Section III 
examines the reasons for the financial imbalance, which are found in financial deregulation, 
and financial and technological innovations. A discussion then follows on whether these 
innovations have reduced or increased risks and instability in the financial system. Section 
IV looks at the consequences of the crisis and what lies ahead. 
 
1. U.S. HOUSING INDUSTRY AND SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 
 
The U.S. housing mortgage party is over. Investment and mortgage bankers made millions, 
some billions, from the party. Wall Street took in $27 billion in revenue from selling and 
trading asset-backed securities (Farzad 2007). Many middle class families saw their home 
equity rise and felt rich. Even those from lower classes “benefited” temporarily. They were 
able to own houses with minimal down payment. As house prices rose, they borrowed more 
on home equity. Everyone was having a good time; median house prices in the U.S. shot up 
40% between 2000 and 2006 to a high of $234,000. The ratio of median house price to 
median household income rose from a historically stable ratio of three times (from 1970–
2000) to five times in 2006 (Leonhardt 2007). This was unsustainable (Papadimitriou, 
Chilcote, and Zezza 2006). House prices tapered off and started to decline by early 2006 and 
are expected to fall sharply in 2007 and 2008. With a $20 trillion housing sector, every 10% 
fall shaves off $2 trillion in household wealth. Concomitantly, default and foreclosure rates 
began to climb. In 2006, 1.2 million household loans were foreclosed, up 42% from the 
previous year. It is expected that two million homes will be foreclosed on in 2007 and even 
more in 2008 when 2.5 million adjustable rate mortgages will reset higher (Schwartz 2007;  
Eoin 2007). 
  Subprime mortgages simply mean lending to house borrowers with weak credit. 
Lenders did so by providing teasers like minimal or zero down payment, and low 
introductory adjustable rate mortgages, as well as lax documentation and credit checks. 
Between 2004 and 2006, $1.5 trillion (15% of the total U.S. housing loans) of subprime  
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mortgages were booked (Brooks and Mitchell 2007). Total subprime loans form 25% of the 
housing mortgage market (Capell 2007); these subprime loans were fine as long as the 
housing market continued to boom and interest rates did not rise. When these conditions 
disappeared, the first to default were subprime borrowers. These defaults caused an 
implosion of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and the collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) industry. The blow out surfaced in June 2007 with the collapse of two subprime 
mortgage hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns, quickly followed by the suspension of 
three other funds managed by BNP Paribas.  
 
1.1 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) 
The securitization of housing mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) has enabled 
banks and mortgage companies to increase the velocity and turnover of loans as banks and 
mortgage companies securitized and sold off these loans. This is known as the “origination-
distribution” model. The volume of MBS originated and traded reached $3 trillion in 2005 in 
a U.S. housing mortgage industry of $10 trillion (Farzad, Goldstein, Henry, and Palmeri 
2007b). Securitization enabled banks and mortgage companies, the originators of these 
loans, to take on more loans as they moved the securitized loans off their books. In fact, 
mortgage companies and real estate developers who entered the fray have overshadowed 
banks that were the traditional home loan providers. Many large housing developers 
aggressively pushed mortgages to borrowers in order to boost sales. For example, Pulte 
Home (the country’s largest developer by market capitalization) provided mortgages for 
90% of the houses they built. These new players have neither the credit skills nor the interest 
to conduct proper due diligence of potential homebuyers. Their interest is in pushing out the 
houses as fast as they are built. The MBS instruments allowed all these institutions to 
transfer the risks to other investors. The dissociation of ownership of assets from risks 
encouraged poor credit assessment and was fundamental in reducing the margin of safety 
and increasing the margin of risks.  
 
1.2 Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
In the early nineties, financial innovation took these MBS to a higher level in terms of 
complication and leverage with the introduction of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
CDOs are simply the bundling of a class of asset-backed securities into a special purpose 
vehicle and then rearranging these assets into different tranches with different credit ratings, 
interest rate payments, and priority of repayment. For example, a CDO could consist of 100  
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subprime MBS. Using historical rates of default and recovery, let us assume that in an 
extreme case of default, the loss ratio is no more than 10%. These subprime MBS are then 
divided into AAA tranche (70%), mezzanine tranche (20%), and subordinated tranche 
(10%). An investor, depending on his risk appetite, can choose which tranche to invest in. 
The AAA tranche pays lowest interest rate, but provides highest priority in terms of debt 
repayment. To further complicate matters, these CDOs were used as underlying assets and 
repackaged to the next level of CDOs. This is referred to as CDO squared and after another 
round, it becomes CDO cubed. Layered on top of these are CDOs of  credit default swaps 
(CDS) that multiplied the risks further. The defaults are confined not only to the underlying 
securities, but also the contracts written (CDS) on the traded securities. Often these CDOs 
cross-hold each other. The higher the level of CDO, the more removed it is from the actual 
underlying security, complicating the pricing of these CDOs. The volume of CDOs issued 
tripled between 2004 and 2006 from $125 billion to $350 billion per year. These CDOs were 
distributed far and wide. It was not only banks throughout the world that bought these 
CDOs, but also staid establishments such as town councils in far flung places like Australia 
that were chasing for higher yields. Bank of China alone is exposed to $9 billion of subprime 
CDOs. Two German state banks investing in CDOs went bankrupt and had to be bailed out 
by the government. 
  These CDOs resemble a house built on a deck of cards; when the cards slip, the 
house falls apart. As subprime borrowers began to default, investors in the subordinate 
tranche of the subprime CDOs took the first hit. This led to a loss of confidence even among 
investors in the safer tranches who had not suffered any losses. Panic ensues as they head for 
the exit door together. The fire sale of assets led to a downward spiral of prices and a freeze 
in funding for these CDOs.  
 
1.3   Credit Crunch Spreads to Other Sectors  
1.31   Conduits and Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) 
What began as a credit squeeze in the subprime mortgage sector quickly spread to other 
areas, particularly to conduits and leverage buy-out transactions initially and later to 
monoline bond insurers, credit default swaps, and finally rippling out to consumer loans 
(credit cards and auto loans). 
  Conduits and SIVs have become a large part of the banking industry. Banks set up 
conduits as special-purpose vehicles to hold assets such as MBS or CDOs for their clients in 
exchange for hefty fees. While banks do not own or control these conduits, they are exposed  
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to them through the provision of back-up credit lines to these conduits. Because these 
exposures are off balance sheet, banks are able to circumvent the capital adequacy ratio. To 
further muddy the waters, most conduits are set up in tax haven territories to avoid tax and to 
circumvent banking regulations and governance. Conduits engage in funding mismatch, i.e., 
they borrow short term in the commercial paper market to invest in long-term, higher-
yielding assets like CDOs and MBS. The size of the conduit market is huge, although there 
is no accurate way to gauge it. Citibank disclosed in its second quarter of 2007 results that it 
had $77 billion of assets and liabilities in conduits. J.P. Morgan had issued $54 billion in 
commercial paper for conduits. Of the $3 trillion global commercial paper market, banks 
provided $1.1 trillion of back-up credit lines to conduits (Reilly and Mollenkamp 2007).  
  In other words, since these conduits can draw on the banks’ credit lines, the risks that 
went out the front door have found their way back through the back door. This is the primary 
reason why the money market froze up in September. Banks were hoarding cash to meet 
their credit obligations in case the conduits knocked on their doors. Hence, despite the ECB 
and the Fed pumping in close to $100 billion of liquidity into the system, the London 
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) climbed to a high of 6.88% (Giles 2007a). In December 
2007, five central banks launched a coordinated effort to pump in hundreds of billions of 
liquidity into the banking system to calm the money market (Giles 2007b). 
 
1.32   Leverage Buy Out (LBOs) 
Leverage buy outs (LBOs) are usually associated with private equity that has exploded in 
recent years. Private equity funds are closely held by high net worth individuals and large 
institutions that are not listed on stock exchanges. They are set up as partnerships to 
minimize taxes; they are unregulated, have no disclosure requirements, and are often 
established in tax haven territories. 
  In an era of loose credit, excess liquidity, and rising asset prices, these funds were 
able to mobilize billions of dollars from the rich, as well as institutions such as pension 
funds, insurance companies, university endowment funds, and government investment 
vehicles. Private equity funds raised $232 billion in 2005, $459 billion in 2006, and $240 
billion in the first half of 2007 (Berman 2007; Economist 2007b). 
  The huge capital at their disposal gives them clout in the market to borrow many 
times over their capital base to take over companies. These transactions are known as LBOs. 
The size of recent LBOs are mind boggling: $32 billion for TXU, a Texas utility company; 
$26 billion for First Data, a credit card processor; $49 billon for BCE, a Canadian telecoms  
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provider (Berman 2007; Economist 2007b). Typically, in LBOs private equity funds put up 
less than 30% of the money themselves. The rest is borrowed from banks and investors 
through the issuance of collateralized loan obligations. 
  The most recent wave of LBOs was fuelled by cheap credit and excess liquidity. 
From 2003 to the first half of 2007, $13.3 trillion (equivalent to the GDP of the United 
States) of LBOs were booked, with $2.7 trillion alone in the first half of 2007, accounting 
for 37% of all investment banking transactions. After the subprime mortgage crisis, LBO 
deals plummeted to $222 billion in August, compared to $579 billion in July and $695 
billion in April of the same year (Berman 2007). Many of these LBOs were funded by 
bridge loans from banks. Banks have over $300 billion of these bridge loans that they have 
difficulty selling or have to sell at a discount (Politi 2007; Ng 2007). Deutsche Bank chief 
Josef Ackermann called on banks to value these securities transparently to restore market 
confidence (Larsen and Simensen 2007). By early October, investment and commercial 
banks lined up to announce their losses. Big players like Citibank, Merrill Lynch, UBS, and 
Deutsche Bank posted close to $20 billion in losses for their third quarter results (Enrich 
2007; Singer, Mollenkamp and Kennedy 2007; Taylor, E. 2007). Three months later, many 
of these same banks had to more than double their initial write down. Banks like Merrill 
Lynch, Citibank, and UBS posted losses of close to $20 billion each.  
  Because of the size of LBO deals and the high level of leverage, defaults in the LBO 
market will be more destabilizing to the financial market than defaults in the subprime 
mortgage market. It was estimated that the recovery rate for distressed LBOs of the early 
2000s was about 75%. Between 2004 and 2007, the leverage (debt to operating profit) of the 
acquired companies rose from 4.8 times to 7.0 times, while their debt servicing capacity 
(operating profit to debt repayment) fell from 3.4 times to 1.8 times (Farzad et al. 2007). 
Some individual deals have leverages as high as ten times. Such high leverage is inherently 
risky in the face of a decline in credit cycle or missed targets in business plans. Rating 
companies are expecting a rise in corporate defaults and reviewing hundreds of thousands of 
bond issues and leveraged transactions (Cookson, O’Connor, and Davies 2008; Saft 2008). 
  Lax credit criteria found in subprime loans are repeated in LBO deals. Until August 
2007, banks offered goodies to the borrowers in the form of “covenant lite” loans (banks 
waived traditional monitoring rights and financial covenants) and payment-in-kind notes 
(borrower need not pay in cash but in-kind using another credit note). In other words, debt is 
piled upon debt. A new covenant known as “you snooze, you loose” is found in LBO deals 
(i.e., borrowers who remain silent are deemed to have given their consent). Many LBO deals  
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struck in the first half of 2007 are now delayed or renegotiated after investors lost their 
appetite for them, prompting law suits against banks who underwrote the deals (Cimilluca 
and Enrich 2007). 
 
1.33  Summary 
While the trigger for the present financial crisis is the collapse of the housing bubble 
beginning with defaults in subprime mortgages, it is the financial bubble that resulted from 
financial innovations over the last three decades that is the fundamental cause of the present 
crisis. Minsky (1986) postulated that the financial system has become more unstable and 
fragile since the sixties, as financing moved increasingly from hedge financing to 
speculative and Ponzi financing. What we witnessed in the subprime and LBO financing is 
nothing short of Ponzi financing. Added to this are the advent of derivative transactions and 
financial products that are so closely interlinked that disruption in any one part has 
immediate knock-on effects on the other parts. These have multiplied the risks and made the 
financial system even more fragile and unstable than it was at the time Minsky wrote about 
it.  
 
2.  WHAT CAUSED THE BUBBLE? 
 
Moving beyond the financial practices, we examine the structural causes of the bubble and 
the role of human agency, in particular hubris and herd mentality. The structural causes are 
located in three types of imbalances—current account, wealth and income, and sectoral—
that are a consequences of modern capitalist growth. 
 
2.1 Hubris 
With great prescience, Minsky (1986) wrote, “ Success breeds a disregard of the possibility 
of failure….As a previous financial crisis recedes in time, it is quite natural for central 
bankers, government officials, bankers, businessmen, and even economists to believe a new 
era has arrived.”  
  This sentiment is echoed in a recent quote by Elizabeth Woyke (2007): “As with the 
current subprime saga, past upheavals in the financial markets have typically been preceded 
by talk of new paradigms, perfect models, and fail-safe strategies—a ‘this time it’s different’ 
attitude.”   
  8
  Typical of this hubris are statements that herald the end of financial history, in the 
same way Francis Fukuyama proclaimed (prematurely) the end of history a decade ago. 
Consider the statements of the following major players. 
  David Rubenstein of the Carlyle Group, one of world’s the largest private equity 
funds, told Financial Times last December, “I don’t think it’s a bubble. I think really what’s 
happening now is that people are beginning to use a different investment technique, and this 
investment technique, private equity, adds real value” (Farzad et al. 2007).  
  Or in the words of Joe Anderson of Countrywide Mortgage, who boasts of their 
ability to understand underwriting risk: “We have a wealth of information we didn’t have 
before. We understand the data and can price the risk” (Farzad et al. 2007).  
  Finally, ponder the wisdom of the guru of the U.S. economy, Alan Greenspan, who 
in 2004 praised the virtues of adjustable-rate mortgages and said of fixed-rate mortgages that 
they “effectively charge homeowners high fees for protection against rising interest rates and 
for the right to refinance” (cited in Authers 2007). In April 2002, just before the economic 
downturn, Greenspan extolled the new financial innovations and confidently talked about the 
“dispersion of risk to those willing and able to bear” it and how this acts like a shock 
absorber to prevent “cascading failures” (cited in Wehrfritz 2007; Federal Reserve Board 
2002). 
 
2.2 Loose Monetary Policies 
With Wall Street and Main Street feeling the pain now, the blame game is on. In his recent 
memoir, Greenspan is quick to blame everyone except himself, even the last President he 
served. Yet while bubbles burst overnight, they are always preceded by a long gestation 
period. Booms and busts are like feasts and famines—they follow one on the other. Bubbles 
build up slowly, they do not balloon overnight. The loose monetary policy of the Federal 
Reserve Bank beginning in late 2001 (under the watch of Greenspan) that was intended to 
pull the U.S. economy out of recession contributed to the continued boom in the housing 
market. With super low interest rates, builders built and buyers bought like there was no 
tomorrow. House prices escalated and values became detached from the underlying rental 
values (Papadimitriou, Chilcote, and Zezza 2006). Professor John Taylor of Stanford blames 
the Fed for loose monetary policy between 2002 and the end of 2004 (Wolf 2007b). He 
argued that interest rates should have risen from the low of 1.75% in 2001 to 5.25% in 2005 
rather than it being pushed down to 1% in 2003 and then raising it slowly (Economist  
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2007d). The Bank of England pursued the same loose monetary policy; it egged on the U.K. 
housing boom and price inflation with rate cuts in 2005. 
  The loose monetary policies of the Fed and the flow of foreign funds into the United 
States encouraged excessive consumption there. Household consumption was the main 
engine of growth, accounting for two-thirds of its GDP growth. This personal consumption 
was, in turn, fueled by rising house prices that made owners feel rich and enabled them to 
draw on home equity loans, which reached a high of $700 billion or 5% of the U.S. GDP in 
2004 (Duncan 2007). 
 
2.3 Global Current Account Imbalances 
A decade ago, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 was caused by the gaping current account 
deficits of emerging countries, mostly financed by private capital inflows that gushed out as 
quickly as they rushed in. Today, most Asian countries have large current account surpluses 
and foreign exchange reserves. Ten Asian countries hold $3.4 trillion or 59% of the world’s 
foreign reserves. China alone has $1.3 trillion (22%) of the world’s reserves.  
  Today, the export surplus and excess savings in other parts of the world—most 
notably the Asian countries—support the consumption habits of the U.S. households and 
government. In 2006, U.S. public debt (excluding the government’s intragovernment debt of 
another $3.8 trillion) stood at $5 trillion, of which $2.2 trillion (44%) was held by foreigners. 
Foreign central banks with huge reserves owned 64% of this $2.2 trillion. The country 
holding the most U.S. public debt was Japan ($612 billion), followed by China ($420 
billion). (Wikipedia from www.federalreserve.gov) This does not include the private debt of 
households in the United States, which totaled $12.8 trillion ($9.7 trillion in housing loans 
and $2.4 trillion in credit card loans). Corporate debt was $9 trillion and financial sector debt 
was $14.2 trillion (Hodges 2007). According to the same report, foreign investors accounted 
for 46% of U.S. Treasury bonds, 27% of corporate bonds, and 14% of government agency 
bonds. In 2007, the U.S. current account deficit of $790 billion was 93% financed by the 
combined current account surpluses of China, Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia 
(Economist 2007e). In other words, ironically, the poorer nations are financing the spending 
habits of U.S. households, corporations, and the government. Since 2004, much of the 
capital inflow has funded asset-backed securities issues, while the volume of government-
agency issues dropped (Duncan 2007).  
  The United States is the largest debtor nation in the world. It has been able to suck in 
all these funds from abroad primarily because the U.S. dollar is still the foremost  
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international currency. This financial privilege stems from its economic, political, and 
military clout and has enabled the United States to enjoy both its guns and butter at the same 
time. How much longer this will last is an open question. 
   There are different views on the causes of this global imbalance. Establishment 
economists like Greenspan and Bernake attribute the problem to excess savings by the 
emerging countries. This sounds strange given the admonishment by Washington and IMF 
to these same countries to live within their means (i.e., to wipe out persistent current account 
deficits during the Asian financial crisis). Today, they call for these same countries to wipe 
out their current account surpluses.  
 
2.4 Wealth and Income Imbalance 
By accounting definition, current account deficits in some countries must be related to 
current account surpluses in other countries, but for the world as a whole, the deficits must 
balance the surpluses. Hence, there is no one-way causation. The problem is similar to 
deciding whether a glass is half full or half empty. The more interesting question is “What 
causes excessive savings and spending?” Excessive savings and underconsumption are two 
sides of the same coin. Why are there excessive savings in some of these emerging 
economies like China and India that have witnessed spectacular yearly growth of about 
10%? 
  One view is that there are not enough profitable investment opportunities or 
attractive financial assets in these economies, or the bond markets are not developed. While 
some of these factors may play a part, an equally (if not more) cogent phenomenon that is 
often overlooked is underconsumption, which is the result of a kind of market-driven growth 
where income and resources are increasingly unequally distributed, notwithstanding the 
claims of Kuznet curve. Hence, in many of these countries, income and wealth inequality 
disparity have worsened, as has been admitted by establishment institutions like the IMF 
(Davis 2007) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).  
   Recent studies of China have shown that income inequality has increased markedly 
over the last two decades despite its phenomenal growth (Yang 1999; Chang 2002; Wu and 
Perloff 2004). Wu and Perloff show that between 1985 and 2001, China’s Gini coefficient 
rose from 0.310 to 0.415 (equivalent to that of the U.S. in 1999), and its mean logarithmic 
deviation (MLD) doubled from 0.164 to 0.317. Yang (1999) and Chang (2002) argue that 
this rising inequality is not about to disappear soon due to the bias against the rural area and  
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rural migrant population. Chen and Wu (2006) provide a detailed anthropological study of 
the bias against the rural peasantry.  
  This inequality is also evident from the disproportionate share of income due to 
capital and labor. The majority who contribute to production do not get a proportionate share 
of the increased productivity, most of it going to capital rather than labor. The World Bank 
estimates the share of China’s GDP to labor fell from 53% in 1998 to 41% in 2005; private 
consumption as a percentage of GDP likewise declined from 47% (1992) to 37% (2006) 
(Economist 2007f). In the United States, the share of GDP going to labor in 2006 was 56%, 
down from 60% in 1970, while the share going to capital rose to 43% from 27% over the 
same period (Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP data 1970–2006). This imbalance 
worsened drastically under President Reagan who dismantled the National Relations Board, 
broke the back of the air traffic control labor union, and renegotiated the accord between 
labor and capital in favor of the latter (Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1986). Capital’s 
share of income rose with successive tax cuts in dividends, capital gains, corporate earnings, 
estate duties, and the like. In other words, the share of GDP going to labor versus capital is 
more a product of political contest and less a result of marginal productivity. 
  Inadvertently, Greenspan alluded to this problem in his interview with Krishna Guha 
(2007), but says he is puzzled by it. He admits that profits are much higher than should be in 
a competitive world and says, “We know in an accounting sense what is causing it”—the 
share of worker compensation in national income in the United States and other developed 
countries is unusually low by historical standards —“but we don’t know in an economic 
sense what the processes are.” He continues that in the long run, real wages should parallel 
increases in productivity, but for now it has veered off course for reasons he is not clear 
about. He worries that if wages for the average U.S. worker do not start to rise more quickly, 
political support for free markets may be undermined (cited in Guha 2007). In contrast, 
Henry Ford, the 20
th century consummate capitalist, understood this conundrum a hundred 
years ago and called for higher wages for the ordinary workers so that they also could buy 
the cars produced. 
  Coming from a Wall Street background, it is strange that Greenspan is hazy about 
this “puzzle.” Perhaps the earnings of Wall Street kids and the tax breaks enacted by his last 
president (G.W. Bush) that he tacitly supported might provide a jolt to his amnesia 
(Krugman 2007). A New York Times study based on the U.S. Treasury computer model 
showed that under the G.W. Bush tax cuts, the 400 taxpayers with highest incomes—a 
minimum of $87 million in 2000—paid the same percentage of taxes as a proportion of their  
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income as people earning $50,000 to $75,000. And 53% of the tax cuts went to people in the 
top 10% income bracket, with 15% going to the top 0.1% or 145,000 tax payers (Johnston 
2005). It is common knowledge that despite the rapid economic growth in the U.S. over the 
last three decades, income and wealth disparity is at its highest. The incomes of many two-
income earner households are less than what they received as one-income earner household 
two decades ago. 
  Even within the private sector, a recent study showed that investment banks pay, on 
average, ten times the average salary in the private sector. On average, an employee in an 
investment bank earns $8,367 per week ($435,084 per year) compared to $841 per week 
($40,368 per year) for the average worker in the private sector (Johnston 2007). This annual 
salary of $435,084 for the average investment banker, however, pales by comparison to the 
millions and billions earned by the big boys and girls in this industry. In 2006, the CEOs of 
Morgan Stanley and of Goldman Sachs received $40 million and $53 million, respectively; 
that is over one thousand times the median household income. The incomes of hedge fund 
managers are astronomical by comparison. Alpha Magazine (published by Institutional 
Investors) tracks the income of hedge fund managers. The top twenty-five hedge fund 
managers earned an average of $570 million in 2006, with the top three earning over $1 
billion each (Taub 2007). The total earnings of these twenty-five hedge fund managers add 
up to $14 billion, equivalent to the GDP of Jordan, which is ranked as the world’s 95
th 
largest economy. Interestingly, in 2005, six of the top twenty-five managers posted returns in 
the single digits and the hedge fund investment returns for the past few years are only half of 
what they were during the 1990s, while their remuneration has soared (Finfacts Team 2006). 
  Most of the wealth generated does not reach the vast majority of population, whilst a 
small minority with excess wealth can only consume so much. This excess wealth must be 
reinvested. In any event, the raison d’etre of capitalism is not consumption but investment to 
yield ever higher profits. The billions and trillions of excess income of rich individuals, 
institutions, and sovereign states has no option but to chase for higher yields. Financial 
institutions and innovations exist to meet these demands, hence, in the midst of today’s 
credit crunch, there is excess liquidity in the financial system looking for profitable 
investment opportunities. For example, sovereign states with an estimated $3–$4 trillion of 





2.5 Sectoral Imbalance between Finance and Real Economy 
Of the different types of imbalances and misallocation of resources, the amount of financial 
and human resources pumped into the financial sector and the rewards reaped by its titans 
must count as one of the more serious imbalances. The volume of financial transactions has 
dwarfed the value of productive investments worldwide, as evidenced by various indicators. 
The ratio of global financial assets to annual world output used to be about equal (109%) in 
1980, but by 2005 it was three times larger (316%). In terms of value, global financial assets 
were $140 trillion (Wolf 2007a). In comparison, the world’s total GDP stood at $48 trillion 
in 2006 (World Bank 2007).  
  Another indicator is the foreign exchange market. Turnover in traditional foreign 
exchange markets (spot, forward, and swaps) increased to an unprecedented level of $3.2 
trillion a day, while activity in the over-the-counter derivatives markets reached $2.1 trillion 
per day (Bank International Settlement 2007). This is compared to the volume of world trade 
at $12 trillion per year.  
  The concept of liquidity is indeed quite liquid. The traditional idea of M1, M2, and 
M3 as the core of liquidity is no longer valid, given financial innovations that have resulted 
in an explosion of other forms of liquidity, like derivatives, that have truly escalated 
leverage. David Roche of Independent Strategy has put forward the concept of the liquidity 
pyramid in which power money (M1 and M2), at the base of this inverted pyramid, forms 
only 1% of the global liquidity pyramid. The next level is broad money, which accounts for 
9%, then securitized debt at 10%, and finally, sitting at the apex are derivatives that account 
for 80% of global liquidity. The global liquidity market is estimated at $607 trillion or 12.5 
times global GDP (Independent Strategy 2007). Given this scenario, central banks have little 
control over the global liquidity market and are hard pressed to influence the cost of capital 
that has been at historic lows with low volatility. This is sometimes known as the new 
monetarism. We have arrived at the stage where what happens in the financial markets 
affects, or perhaps dictates, what happens in the real economy. It is the case of the tail 











Source: Independent Strategy (2007) 
 
3.  DEREGULATION, LIBERALIZATION, AND FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS 
 
How does one explain the explosion of financial markets? There are structural forces at work 
causing this phenomenon. We have discussed the loose and stable monetary framework, and 
the excess liquidity in the world that has caused investors to chase higher yields and 
loosened credit standards. This explosion has also been enabled by technological innovations 
and financial innovations that occurred with the rolling back of regulations (i.e., 
liberalization and deregulation of the markets). After the Great Depression of the thirties, the 
U.S. government tightened anti-trust laws and banking regulations to protect and stabilize 
the financial system. One of the important pieces of legislation was the Glass-Steagall Act, 
which separated commercial from investment banks and prohibited interstate banking. The 
Act also regulated the activities of commercial banks, including interest rates charged and 
the restricted entry into riskier investments. 
  Beginning in the seventies, commercial banks lobbied hard for the dismantling of the 
Act. This picked up pace under Reagan and, by 1999, the last vestige of the Act was 
scrapped under President Clinton. Commercial banks could now engage in investment 
banking activities that included not only trading bonds and other types of securities, but also  
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underwriting them. The fact that this often created conflicts of interest did not bother them. 
For example, there is supposed to be a “Chinese wall” separating the commercial lending 
department of a bank that provides traditional loans to a company and the investment 
banking department of the same bank that issues and underwrites corporate bonds. While 
this Chinese wall may prevent lower-level bank officials from knowing what the other 
departments do, this is often not the case with highly placed bank officials like the Chief 
Executive Officer who has access to all information in the bank. Often banks receive heftier 
fees for investment banking activities over commercial loans, hence, the latter are sacrificed 
(e.g., relaxing credit standards for investment banks). 
  The decline of lending activities and the rise of investment banking activities in 
commercial banks can be seen from the data collected by FDIC for all U.S. commercial 
banks. The ratio of noninterest income (from investment banking) to net interest income 
(from lending) has risen from 0.25% to 0.75% between 1980 and 2005 (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 2007). In 1980, net interest income was $56 billion, compared to $14 
billion for noninterest income. By 2005, net interest income was $270 billion versus $201 
billion for non-interest income. In other words, income from investment banking (fee 
income and trading income) has risen much faster than income from traditional loans. By 
nature, investment banking activities are riskier and the profits more volatile than those from 
commercial banking activities. 
  Advances in telecommunications and computers have simultaneously globalized and 
shrunk banking, particularly in foreign exchange trading where billions of dollars are 
transferred instantaneously across the globe and the market operates world-wide, 24-hours a 
day. Advances in financial theories, particularly with the advent of pricing options, have 
pushed trading to higher levels. Trading originally involved only the underlying assets, for 
example, stocks, bonds, real estate, commodities, etc., but the introduction of derivatives 
heralded the trading of new securities that were not the underlying assets, but were based on 
(or derived from) the underlying assets. Such derivative transactions are often highly 
leveraged. The buyer puts up only a small percentage of capital to buy the option. While the 
risks to the buyer of the option are limited to the loss of his capital, the risks to the seller of 
the option are unlimited, unless he is hedged.  
  There are differing views on the reasons and consequences of financial innovations. 
Advocates see financial innovations as democratizing credit, making funds available to those 
who once could not afford it, reducing credit risks by spreading risks to a larger community 
of investors, increasing efficiencies by merging and taking over companies, and making  
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better use of capital through leverage, as well as better allocation of resources by deploying 
them to where they can earn higher profits.   
  Critics view financial innovations as strategies to enhance profits and to run one step 
ahead of regulations. As early as in the fifties, Minsky had written about this and postulated 
that the financial industry undergoes waves of innovation, regulation, deregulation, and 
periods of stability and instability (Minsky 1957; 1986). Each wave is marked by some new 
product or technique, be it junk bonds, LBOs, dotcom and, more recently, subprime loans 
and CDOs. Human greed is part of nature and as long as the environment and system allow 
and encourage such behavior, the consequences are predictable. For example, a major reason 
for the popularity of structured investment vehicles and private equity funds is to avoid 
disclosure, regulation, monitoring, and taxes. Financial regulators and legislators have 
woken up to this and at the recent meeting of central bankers in Jackson Hole, European 
Central Bank chief Jean-Claude Trichet, called for tackling unregulated entities that have 
contributed to the upheaval (Eoin, Grant, Barber 2007). Barney Frank, a United States 
Senator, said that innovation has outstripped regulation and called for better regulations 
(Washington 2007). 
 
3.1 Economic Value Added (EVA) School 
It is often said that bankers and financiers have short memories and tend to repeat their poor 
lending or trading habits. The issue is not the individual memory of these financiers, but the 
system that demands profit maximization. They operate in an institution where their 
individual performance is measured by the profits they bring—nothing else. In the last few 
decades, the Economic Value Added (EVA) school of thought has provided even greater 
ideological and theoretical underpinning to this behavior. It has been wholeheartedly 
embraced by the captains of industry and finance, and has even spread to the public sector. 
Put simply, EVA states the primary, if not the sole, objective of a company or economic 
enterprise is to maximize shareholders’ value, treating other stakeholders like employees and 
the public as irrelevant. EVA is the criterion used to measure the performance of every 
institution, every department, and every individual. EVA is calculated using the net present 
value of the cash flow of the activity discounted by the weighted average cost of capital. 
Every activity and individual is compared against this yardstick and the ones with the 
highest EVA are rewarded. Hence, within the banking system itself, one finds that traditional 
lending is out of favor as it consumes too much capital and results in lower EVA, whilst 
activities such as trading in securities and derivatives that use less capital and produce higher  
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EVA are promoted. It then becomes rational for every individual pursing his or her own 
interest to push the edge of the envelope, maximize her returns, and worry about the 
consequences later. A banker who brings in loans of the highest value is rewarded the same 
year, but if and when the loans turn bad a few years later, she/he has already moved on. This 
incentive structure invites the banker to take on extra risks, reap the rewards, and move on. 
There are recent calls for bankers’ compensation to be restructured into long-term contracts 
to take account of eventual risks and failures down the road (Wolf 2008). 
 
3.2 Old Wine in a New Bottle 
Applied collectively then, it is not irrational for each individual and each institution to push 
the edge of the envelope. What is in the interest for an individual or a bank may, however, 
not be in the interest of the whole, as it creates stresses in the system that results in crisis. 
Viewed from a systemic and historical perspective, the present subprime mortgage crisis is 
simply a variant of previous crises with new features that have multiplied the risks. It is as 
the title implies—old wine in new bottle. As a matter of fact, given all the new financial 
innovations, the underlying cause is not very new. It is no different from the problems of the 
savings and loan crisis in the eighties or the Asian financial crisis of the nineties that resulted 
from funding mismatch. This can take the form of funding on a short-term, variable basis 
and investing on a long-term, fixed basis to capture the interest rate differential, as in the 
case with the savings and loan associations and the mortgage lenders for today’s subprime 
loans. It can also take the form of borrowing short term in a currency that charges low 
interest and investing long term in another currency with higher yields, as in the case of 
Asian banks and companies caught in the financial crisis of the nineties or the prevalent 
carry trades of today.  
  Much of the blame in the Asian financial crisis was laid on crony capitalism and poor 
corporate governance in the emerging-market countries. There was much talk of a new 
international financial architecture to avoid a repeat crisis. Basel II worked to strengthen the 
capital base of banks and to enhance risk control by having banks take account of not only 
credit risks but also market and operational risks. However, the international financial 
structure has changed quite dramatically, pulling in many nonbank financial institutions as 
major players into the financial markets, whose combined capital could be larger than that of 
banks. Prominent among these are hedge funds, investment banks, private equity funds, 
mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, finance companies, etc. Many of these 
latter institutions are outside the regulation of banking regulators, although some (like  
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pension funds and insurances) have their own set of regulators. Furthermore, banks are 
closely linked and exposed to these nonbank financial institutions through credit lines, 
bridge loans, trading lines, standby letters of credit, repo lines, etc. In other words, even as 




The dispersion of risks has been touted as a financial innovation that has transformed the 
credit and risk terrain, as exemplified in the earlier quote of Greenspan, and is believed by 
optimists to bring about the end of financial history. Or are they “financial weapons of mass 
destruction” in the words of Warren Buffet? (Economist 2007a). As we have recently 
discovered, the dispersion of risks may not even be the reduction of risks, let alone their 
elimination. Theoretically, if credit risk is spread around rather than concentrated in banks, 
the chances of bank failures and financial instability are lessened. As the proliferation of 
CDOs and credit default swaps illustrate, because banks are able to separate credit risk from 
market risk and to sell these risks away, the tendency is for investors to take on bigger bets 
with less down payment and for banks to issue more loans and other securitized assets 
(Anderson and Timmons 2007; Economist 2007c; Tett 2007). Hence, the system takes on 
more risks. While risk is dispersed for the individual players, it is amplified for the system. 
As David Roche (Independent Strategy 2007) argues, the perceived reduction of risks causes 
lower asset price volatility that in turn encourages players to take on more leverage to buy 
assets, thus driving up financial asset prices. Leveraging is great as long as volatility and 
capital costs are low and prices rise; once capital costs increase and liquidity contraction 
occurs, the process of de-leveraging kicks in and the downward spiral can be quick and 
painful. We are witnessing the beginning of this process, with bumps along the way. 
Furthermore, as risk is spread far and wide, little is known about who hold these risks and 
whether these investors understand the nature of the risks. Again, as Buffet puts it 
graphically, we do not know who is naked until the tide begins to recede. 
  In a recent article, Jan Kregel (2008) has argued that the replacement of traditional 
banking methods of credit assessment based on personal, cumulative knowledge of the credit 
history and character of borrowers has been replaced with impersonal statistical methods of 
credit assessment used by rating agencies in rating CDOs. This fundamental shift in credit 
assessment has dramatically undervalued and mispriced risks.   
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  Beyond credit, market, and operational risks, there is liquidity risk. The concept of 
liquidity risk is the most difficult to pin down, quantify, or control. It is essentially a 
behavioral risk and behavior is not always rational—it is prone to habits like fear, greed, 
herd mentality, irrationality, loss of confidence, etc. Liquidity is very much a function of 
confidence, which is the most elusive of all risks. Chris Mahoney, vice chairman of Moody’s 
Rating Agency, says in such a system the weakest link is confidence and that confidence is a 
state of mind, which is challenging for financial authorities to fix (cited in Scholtes 2007). 
There are calls for banks to price and charge for liquidity risks. 
  When a crisis strikes, the effect is contagious and it leads to a crisis of confidence. As 
we witnessed in the CDO discussion, when investors in AAA-rated tranche of a CDO who 
have not lost any money have lost confidence, the whole structure collapses. Lenders do not 
want to fund any more CDOs, even the AAA-rated tranches, as they could be tainted by the 
mezzanine or subprime tranches; investors rush to redeem funds, sending prices downward. 
The crisis faced by Northern Rock Mortgage Company in U.K. illustrates how contagious a 
confidence crisis is. Even though the company was not exposed to subprime mortgages, it 
got into trouble due to its cost-reduction strategy of depending on the wholesale market and 
large institutions, rather than small depositors, for funding. While jumbo loans and funds are 
cheaper, they are more volatile and can quickly dry up, forcing a liquidity crunch for the 
bank and, in this case, causing a run on the bank by small depositors. 
  Changes in the international financial architecture have left a few important bastions 
of poor governance and poor transparency untouched—namely the existence of tax havens, 
banking secrecy laws, and tax loopholes. This neglect cannot be attributed to sheer 
oversight; it is more a reflection of the power of vested interests. In his book, Stiglitz 
recounts how the U.S. authorities, so eager to preach and impose good corporate governance 
on the rest of the world, balked at the proposal of OECD to improve transparency of 
offshore banking centers. The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury even rationalized the lack of 
transparency as having benefits (Stiglitz 2004). These loopholes have enabled and 
encouraged the big players in the financial industry to reap substantial benefits. The 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) director in England has recently called for greater 
transparency and disclosure by private equity funds and questioned the tax loopholes that 





4. QUO VADIS? 
  
On September 18, 2007, the Federal Reserve Bank lowered the Fed Fund rate by 0.5% in its 
attempt to prevent the financial crisis from snowballing into a recession. This cheered the 
equity markets worldwide initially, but it left concerns about the U.S. fundamentals, as it 
signaled that the housing slump could lead to a slump in the whole economy. Since the start 
of the crisis, despite the Fed having aggressively lowered interest rates four times (from 
5.25% to 3.5%) in a matter of four months, world equity markets have gyrated violently 
indicating a lack of confidence in the Fed’s ability to avoid a U.S. recession. The long-term 
rates, over which the Fed has no control, have remained at their previous levels or even 
edged up, indicating the market’s concern over inflationary pressures. This steepening of the 
yield curve primarily benefits banks and financial institutions and helps repair their impaired 
balance sheet, as was the case after the savings and loans crisis of the eighties. Whether the 
lower interest rates translate into benefits for borrowers is doubtful for various reasons. First, 
consumers are so loaded with debt that they have little capacity to take on anymore loans. 
Many have resorted to their credit cards as a lender of last resort. Outstanding credit card 
loans soared in the third and fourth quarters of 2007 and promise to be another bubble on the 
horizon (Norris 2008). Second, banks have reined in credit not only because of tighter credit 
lending standards, but also because they can’t afford to lend. For the first time in over fifty 
years, U.S. banks’ reserves with the Fed have plunged to negative. As of January 2008, 
about $100 billion of losses have been recognized by U.S. banks and financial institutions. It 
is likely more losses are yet to come. Estimates run from $200 billion to $400 billion by 
Greenspan (cited in Guha 2008), to $1 trillion by Nouriel Roubini of New York University, 
who warns that the present $100 billion recognized could multiply ten-fold if defaults spread 
to consumer loans, credit cards, and corporate lending (Lohr 2008). This is equivalent to 
wiping out the total capital of U.S. banks and could represent the biggest banking crisis since 
the Depression. George Soros even calls it the worst financial crisis in sixty years (Soros 
2008).  
  If history is any guide, the aggressive interest rate cuts by the Fed under Bernanke 
look quite similar to those undertaken by Greenspan in 2002–3. While this may have a short-
term effect on the economy, it could just postpone the problem and pave the way for future 
bubbles. Adrian Blundell-Wignall, a former Federal Bank economist, warns of the effects of 
the “rolling bubble,” i.e., each time the Fed responds to a financial crisis with aggressive rate 
cuts, the liquidity surge just paves the way for a future bubble that collapses and leads to  
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another round of crises (Tan 2007). This happened in the 1997–98 Asian crisis, which was 
followed by the Long Term Capital Management blow up wherein Greenspan lowered the 
interest rate, that then helped to fuel the dotcom crash. In September 2007, the rate cuts sent 
the stock markets surging all over the world and reignited risky deals associated with 
leverage buy-outs and CDOs. In Singapore, DBS and OCBC (two major banks) have staged 
a return to marketing CDOs. The OCBC insurance arm said in a statement that the new CDO 
fund “aims to take advantage of the current market conditions to offer high credit ratings, 
reasonably attractive returns, and good insurance cover to policyholders” (Kowsmann 2007).  
  Market participants cautioned that while the action “will help to get the deals done, it 
is a bit worrisome because the recent correction in credit was all about getting leverage 
down” said Chris Towle, a portfolio manager at Lord Abbett & Co. (cited in Sender and Ng 
2007). Another article in the AWSJ the following day asked whether an Asian bubble is 
starting, quoting Michael Hartnert, an emerging market strategist at Merrill Lynch who said, 
“It’s like 1998 in reverse. A bubble is more likely than not. But I think we’re only at the 
beginning of that process” (Lahart and Slater 2007). 
  Standard and Poor’s, a credit rating agency, estimated that companies could default 
on $35 billion of their debt, but warned that if the economy and debt market worsen, 
corporate defaults could reach over $250 billion, comparable to the level reached in 2001–02 
(Guerrera 2007). The same article noted that 40% of U.S. corporate debt outside the 
financial sector was rated “B,” i.e., as junk bonds. These companies have average debt-to-
earnings ratios of six times before interest, tax, and depreciation (EBITDA). We noted 
earlier that the average leverage ratio of LBO companies was even higher at seven times.  
  In other words, it is possible or likely (depending on one’s views) that despite the 
recent actions of the Fed and other central banks, Act II of the crisis may unfold (Munchau 
2007a and 2007b). Act I is the housing slump that has affected the financial markets and is 
spreading to other credit markets, including credit cards and auto loans; Act II is the effect 
on the real economy. Further falls in the U.S. housing market would no doubt affect 
consumer spending and would drag the economy into recession. This, in turn, affects foreign 
creditors’ worries about the strength of the U.S. dollar, which has reached a record low of 
$1.49 to one euro. If the euro moves higher and stays in that region for a long period, it 
would no doubt affect European exports and growth. Economists and central bankers are 
clamoring for Europe, China, and other emerging countries to step up to the plate to increase 
domestic spending. If that happens, it could stave off a world-wide recession and allow for a 
gradual reduction, rather than a free fall, of the U.S. dollar with disastrous consequences for  
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all. However, contrary to the decoupling theories, China has voiced concerns that a U.S. 
recession would be devastating to her economy. In October 2007, when the first draft of this 
paper was written and most economists were still optimistic that the U.S. economy would 
not fall into recession, the author had raised the possibility of stagflation. Today, only the 
die-hard optimists think the U.S. could avoid a recession. While few, if any, economists in 
the U.S. talk about stagflation, some in Asia (particularly in China) have raised the specter of 
stagflation. In China, as in much of the world, the era of disinflation is ending with the rise 
in oil and food prices, and the pressure for higher wages that is pushing up the price of its 
exports (Beck 2008). Coupled with that, the financial markets are entering into a new era of 
repricing risks that could push interest rates higher and make for more expensive borrowing, 
hence, we could end up having slow or negative growth with rising inflation.   
 
4.1 Moral Hazards 
Central banks play a dual role—to maintain price and to ensure financial stability. In the 
latter objective, they act as lenders of last resort. In fulfilling these objectives, they carry out 
a balancing act. In theory, central banks are supposed to be neutral actors, free from political 
and vested interest influence. In practice, they tend to be more biased towards price stability 
(i.e., prevention of inflation) than meeting employment objectives. 
  In a modern economy, the financial system is not only integral to the smooth 
function of the whole economy, it has come to dominate over the productive sectors of the 
economy. Any financial instability is automatically transmitted to the whole economy and, 
indeed, globally to the international economy. With mergers and mega-mergers, 
corporations and financial institutions have become behemoths so that the assets or sales of 
many of these institutions are bigger than the GDP of most emerging-market countries. The 
total assets of Bank of America, the second biggest U.S. bank, are $1.47 trillion. Its total 
revenue is $73 billion and net income is $21 billion (Bank of America 2006). Only ten 
countries in the world had GDP of over $1 trillion in 2006. Bank of America’s total revenue 
of $73 billion places it as the 56
th largest economy in the world, behind Kazakhstan at $77 
billion. Size matters. When an institution becomes so large, its bankruptcy sends shock 
waves through the financial system and ultimately to the economy, so central banks must 
step in to calm the waters. 
  Wolfgang Munchau writes that moral hazard is the result of asymmetric expectation, 
as when the market expects central banks to bail out the financial sector during a crisis 
(Munchau 2007a). It occurs when banks and other institutions are rescued from their  
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imprudent actions, either directly through bail-outs or indirectly through rate cuts, because 
the consequences of not coming to their rescue could result in bigger pain for depositors or 
for the whole economy. We witness this as the Fed hedges on whether it will further reduce 
the interest rate while the market has already factored that possibility into market prices. 
However, the state and, ultimately, the tax payers are paying for the enormous costs 
associated with such interventions. Moral hazard is the equivalent of the privatization of 
gains and the socialization of risks. It is a form of what economists term as “externality,” 
i.e., the costs of one’s actions are passed on the public.  
  Recent history has shown that every time there is a major financial crisis due to lax 
credit, excessive risk taking, speculation, and poor corporate governance, central banks and 
governments have stepped in to pick up the mess. This happened in the 1980s during the 
U.S. savings and loans crisis that ultimately cost tax payers about $200 billion or 4% of its 
GDP. The same happened in the Asian financial crisis. Between 1994–1996, international 
banks pumped $264 billion of net funds into twenty-five emerging markets, and the total 
outstanding foreign obligations in South East Asia stood at $736 billion (Sachs and 
Warner1999). Many international banks lent to and traded excessively with local banks and 
corporations under the assumption that these institutions were too large and important to fail 
and the governments would intervene in a time of crisis. And step in they did. Asian 
governments pumped in billions to bail out banks and to set up asset management companies 
to purchase bad loans, all at the expense of tax payers. Studies on the cost of such bail-outs 
for various countries range from a high of 55% of GDP for Indonesia, to 16% of GDP for 
Malaysia, 34% for Thailand, 13% for the Philippines, and 24% for Japan (Caprio and 
Kilingebiel 2003; Mongid 2007). If losses from the present financial crisis reach $500 billion 
to $1 trillion, it would represent between 4% and 8% of the U.S. GDP. So far, most of the 
recapitalization of the banks has come from foreign sources, in particular sovereign wealth 
funds.  
  Even if the U.S. government does not step in to bail out specific financial 
institutions, its lack of option to stand by idly when the economy is in a tailspin supports the 
concern that governments and central banks will step in to protect voters from the 
consequences of bank failures and the economy from sliding into recession. Such action 
ultimately encourages risk-taking and bad behavior. The banking and financial sector is 
about the only sector that has repeatedly gone through one crisis after another where the 
state has to come to its rescue. This is because the breakdown of a country’s banking and  
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financial system is too disastrous for a modern credit-driven economy, hence the need for 
constant bail outs. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the optimism, or perhaps more appropriately because of the hubris, of market 
players in the financial system who herald the passing away of booms and busts (i.e., the end 
of financial history), we witness their increasing regularity. Also, in spite of the latest 
financial innovations, banks and financial institutions take on the same risks except they are 
larger in magnitude. In many cases, they employ the classic strategy of leverage and 
mismatch funding to maximize yields as manifested in the latest round of debacle hitting 
mortgage banks and structure investment vehicles. This same strategy was employed and 
accounted for the collapse of the savings and loans association twenty years ago. What is 
new this round is the “origination and distribution” model that has dispersed and broadened 
financial risks. To prevent the collapse of the financial industry and its impact of the real 
economy, the state has stepped in to assist the ailing housing industry, in particular, and the 
financial industry, in general.  
   The subprime mortgage defaults did not cause the financial crisis; they only acted as 
a trigger. The financial crisis is fundamentally a consequence of three types of imbalances: 
wealth and income imbalance, current account imbalance, and financial sector imbalance 
that together with financial innovations, has dispersed and magnified risks for the whole 
financial system. The financial tsunami has spread out worldwide affecting banks in Europe 
and Asia, though the latter are still relatively contained and healthy enough to withstand the 
problems. While the initial negative impact on liquidity in the money market system has 
been alleviated through massive liquidity injection by central banks, the problem may have 
escalated to one of insolvency.   
  It is telling that the U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson, a former Wall Street banker, 
warned as early as September of last year that the problem is not short term but will be with 
us for a while (cited in Callan, Grant, and Barber 2007). It remains to be seen how this crisis 
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